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In 1997, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Frank Easterbrook 
authored a now-iconic opinion in Hill v. Gateway 2000.1 He wrote: 
A customer picks up the phone, orders a computer, and gives a 
credit card number. Presently a box arrives, containing the 
computer and a list of terms, said to govern unless the customer 
returns the computer within 30 days. Are these terms effective as 
the parties’ contract, or is the contract term-free because the order-
taker did not read any terms over the phone and elicit the 
customer’s assent?2 
Shipping boxes often arrive with terms-in-the-box, terms that bind 
the purchaser to all sorts of things she really had no reason to anticipate or 
care about. Routinely, these terms include mandatory arbitration, dubbed 
by the court in Hill as “legal-ware.” 3 Unfortunately, this court’s framing 
of the problem presents a false dichotomy: there are many potential 
solutions other than the two Judge Easterbrook identified. So how should 
contract law deal with terms-in-a-box? 
This Article makes a surprising proposal. The key to solving the 
terms-in-a-box problem, and many similar problems of modern contract 
law, is to analyze them from the perspective of an Aristotelian just 
exchange using conceptual reasoning. Though counter-intuitive—what 
could Aristotelian thought possibly have to do with online ordering 
followed by legal-ware-terms-in-a-box?—this Article will show that the 
approach is actually quite promising. In short, modern contractors already 
behave in ways that meet the requirements of an Aristotelian just 
exchange. For an exchange to be just, the exchange must be one in which, 
                                                     
 1. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 2. Id. at 1148. 
 3. Id. at 1150. 
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loosely, each party benefits but neither at the expense of the other.4 Just 
exchanges and terms are enforceable. Unjust exchanges and terms are not. 
Developing empirical studies now prove that modern contractors in 
certain situations do behave in ways in which each benefits, but neither at 
the expense of the other. For example, when asked about mutual 
expectations of cooperative behavior in certain business-to-business 
transactions, contractors tell researchers they expect each other to 
demonstrate flexibility, to share information proactively, and to 
reciprocate professional courtesies.5 They do this not only because they 
believe it will make for a better deal for both parties (which I call 
mutualism) but also, in many cases, even at the partial expense of profit—
when they think it is the fair thing and the right thing (which I call 
dualism). Moreover, studies of individual economic actors’ motives (i.e., 
individuals representing their own interests, not a company’s) also show 
that desires for social norms of equity and fairness can drive economic 
decision-making. 
The problem is contract law is not built to account for—to process or 
analyze—either the mutualism or the dualism of modern economic 
behavior. Instead, contract law and contract theory are good at handling 
one thing at a time, but not two. Contract law asks, “What is the parties’ 
intent?”, as if there is one single, shared intent expressed in a contract. 
Contract theory asks, “Will this rule promote efficiency?”, or “Does this 
remedy respect full promise-keeping?”, or “Does the application of this 
rule to these facts respect autonomy?” In other words, contract law and 
theory seem to ask one half of the Aristotelian formula for a just exchange: 
either about the goal of the contract (which is usually assumed to be wealth 
maximization), or how the goal is to be achieved (which varies by theory). 
But contractors are doing all of these things. The law is not keeping up. 
An Aristotelian approach to contract law, by contrast, could keep up 
quite well. One reason is that, as I have explained in previous work, 
Aristotelian reasoning directs a legal analyst to consider both the means 
and ends of the thing being analyzed.6 Means-ends analysis is familiar in 
constitutional law, but not in contract. Yet I maintain that means-ends 
reasoning would be very helpful to contract analysis. Another reason is 
that, also explained in prior work, empirical evidence shows that modern, 
                                                     
 4. See, e.g., JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: PROPERTY, TORT, CONTRACT, 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT 12 (2007) [hereinafter PRIVATE LAW] (according to principles of Aristotelian 
justice in private exchange, “[c]ommutative justice required that [each contractor set] a price that 
enriched neither party at the other’s expense”).  
 5. See Chapin Cimino, The Relational Economics of Commercial Contract, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 
91 (2015) [hereinafter Relational Economics]. 
 6. See Chapin Cimino, Virtue and Contract Law, 88 OR. L. REV. 703 (2009) [hereinafter Virtue 
and Contract Law]. 
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business-to-business contractors do care about both the means and ends of 
exchange relationships—they expect each other to voluntarily share 
information even when it is not required by the contract, for example, or 
to be flexible when flexibility is not required by the contract.7 This Article 
ties together and extends these ideas. Here, I connect the Aristotelian 
means-ends reasoning about contracts with the means-ends expectations 
of individual economic actors. This final step shows that Aristotelian 
reasoning about contracts would be downright sensible. In sum, the thesis 
of this Article is that an Aristotelian contract jurisprudence can make good 
sense of what modern commercial contractors tell academic researchers 
they expect of each other, and of the fact that individual economic actors 
make unexpected choices not predicted by standard rational action 
models.8 Because of this possibility, we ought not give up on law’s ability 
to make sense of contracts. 
This analysis proceeds in six steps. In Part I, this Article sets the stage 
by describing the problem: while contracting behavior is increasingly 
complex, contract law and theory remain stubbornly uni-faceted. That is, 
while contracting and contractors are ever more modern, contract law and 
theory are ever more traditional. The greater the divide, the less useful 
contract theory is to contract law, and the less useful contract law is to 
contractors. This trend does not bode well for the future of contract law or 
theory. The question is how much of a crisis contract law will have to 
endure before the law evolves to keep up. 
Then in Parts II and III, I move to research not widely discussed in 
contract law literature showing that contractors can, and often do, pursue 
more than economic gain in a transaction. There are two different bodies 
of this research. First, I show in Part II that under certain conditions, 
contractors in business-to-business transactions hold shared expectations 
that each will adopt certain relational contracting behaviors, such as 
flexibility and reciprocity, over the course of their contracting 
relationship.9 These shared expectations become the expectation of the 
contracting unit—of both parties. This Article names this expectation 
                                                     
 7. See Relational Economics, supra note 5. 
 8. In many ways, I am taking up an invitation made by Professor Paul J. Gudel, who wrote:  
In developing Relational Contract Theory, one of the most important things lawyers and 
law professors can do, ill-suited as they are to do it, is to return to philosophical questions 
of the motivation of human action, its natural ends and goals and its distinctive virtue and 
characteristic excellence, as the Greeks would have said. Without this understanding, we 
cannot construct theoretical models that will adequately reflect humans’ interests and 
commitments in contracting behavior.  
Paul J. Gudel, Relational Contract Theory and the Concept of Exchange, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 763, 791–
92 (1998). I am grateful for this invitation. 
 9. Relational Economics, supra note 5, at 110–11. 
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mutualism, and explains a little bit of why it is that business economists, 
but not legal economists, have integrated relational contract norms into 
their economic modeling. 
Part III discusses the second body of relevant research, which is 
being done by behavioral and experimental economists. This work 
demonstrates that individual contracting actors also respond to different 
motives while contracting, which I call dualism. In this Part, I explain that 
this research not only confirms that individual economic actors are 
motivated by goals beyond efficiency, but it shows that contractors make 
predictable choices based on these motivations. 
Part IV illustrates more precisely why the mutualism and dualism of 
modern relational contract behaviors have Aristotelian underpinnings. At 
its core, it has to do with reciprocity: the reciprocity that is integral to 
relational contracting behaviors is also a fundamental characteristic of 
Aristotelian just exchange.10 Once these pieces are in place, a coherent 
contracting picture emerges. It is one that makes total sense once we 
transcend the normative boxes of existing legal theory. 
Finally, Part V takes up the question of what modern contract law 
analysis might look like if courts interpreted contract law as facilitating an 
exchange that meets the requirement of Aristotelian commutative justice 
of each benefits, but neither at the expense of the other. To flesh this out, 
I offer an example of a paradigmatic problem in contract law, the 
mandatory arbitration term-in-a-box. I analyze that problem from the 
perspective of an Aristotelian conceptual analysis of the contract law 
issues that the problem presents, drawing on a new classic of contract law, 
Hill v. Gateway 2000,11 and comparing it to a very recent decision from 
the Ninth Circuit.12 
I. THE PROBLEM: NEITHER CONTRACT LAW NOR THEORY IS 
BUILT FOR MODERN CONTRACTS 
When law is indeterminate, theory has a role to play. To be useful, 
however, theory ought to be informed by the realities of the institution the 
theory is explaining. Legal philosopher William Lucy calls this concept 
“the methodological injunction,” which is that “any adequate theoretical 
account . . . of any social action, practice or institution, must, in the first 
instance, capture the way in which that action, practice or institution, is 
understood by those whose patterns of behavior and thought constitute that 
                                                     
 10. See RICARDO F. CRESPO, PHILOSOPHY OF THE ECONOMY: AN ARISTOTELIAN APPROACH 112 
(2013). 
 11. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1147–51 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 12. Norcia v. Samsung Telecomms. Am., LLC, 845 F.3d 1279 (9th Cir. 2017). 
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action, practice or institution.”13 The problem for contract, as this Part will 
show, is that neither contract theory nor contract law today score very high 
on that metric. 
A. The Pressures 
Contract law seems to be quickly approaching a fundamental 
paradigm shift. For many years, scholars and courts were surprisingly 
unconcerned about the fact that the common law of contract we inherited 
from England was built for much simpler times. Starting with the legal 
realists in the 1930s, however, contract law scholars have voiced more 
concern. In recent years, they have increasingly questioned the usefulness 
of a doctrinal paradigm that was built to handle discrete, one-off exchange 
relationships, while contracts today are, as everyone concedes, 
relational.14 Today, even law-and-economics scholars accept the truth of 
the relational paradigm, but they continue to resist that law can or should 
do anything about it.15 That matters because many key contract doctrines, 
like the rule of blanket assent, are predicated on the outdated model. One 
of that model’s most public failures is, as will be shown later,16 the 
question of assent to legal-ware in online contracting. 
When doctrine breaks down, theory can be helpful. Legal theory can 
be useful to explain or organize existing law, and it can be useful to help 
courts determine what to do in close or novel cases. But contract theory is 
in trouble too. Mostly contract theorists are what philosophers call 
“monists”: theorists who attempt to explain or organize contract law 
according to the primacy of a single value. Each different theory points 
courts in a different direction according to that theory’s principal value. 
For example, as law-and-economics theory (“L&E”) points courts toward 
efficiency,17 contract-as-promise theory points toward full enforcement of 
                                                     
 13. WILLIAM LUCY, THE PHILOSOPHY OF PRIVATE LAW 272 (2007) (noting that subscribers to 
the methodological injunction include Hart, Dworkin, Weinrib, and Coleman). 
 14. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Promise and Peril of Relational Contract Theory, reprinted 
in REVISITING THE CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART MACAULAY: ON THE EMPIRICAL AND THE 
LYRICAL 105, 105–06 (Jean Braucher et al. eds., 2013) (noting and explaining “definitional 
difficulties” in the term “relational contract theory” resulting from the different approaches of law and 
economics “relational theory” and law and society “relational theory”). 
 15. See Ethan J. Leib, Contracts and Friendships, 59 EMORY L.J. 649, 654–55 (2010) (using the 
term “strangership” and noting that “[t]o the extent that one hears that ‘we are all relationists now,’ all 
this statement means is that most people have embraced the relationists’ empirical observation”) 
 16. See infra Part V. 
 17. See Mark Cooney, Why Is Economic Analysis So Appealing to Law Professors?, 45 STAN. 
L. REV. 2211 (1993) (reviewing ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS 
SETTLE DISPUTES (1991)). 
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obligations, and contract-as-consent theory points toward the objective 
manifestation of autonomy.18 
Supporters of each of these theories have been arguing with each 
other for years. Each camp believes it, and only it, has the key to unlock 
the mysteries of contract law. While reconciliation between the competing 
theories is not impossible,19 it does not seem to be in the offing any time 
soon. One possible solution was thought to be a theory of contract known 
as pluralism. Pluralism, unlike most of the other theories of contract law, 
argues for bringing multiple values under the contract law tent. For now, 
however, there are multiple visions of pluralism, including what the term 
actually means, as well as various visions of how the approach might 
impact contract law.20 It remains at the question-raising stage. 
In the meantime, with ever-increasing globalization and ever-
expanding possibilities of technology, among other change-drivers, real-
world exchanges grow more complex each day. The complexity is not 
limited to the exchanges, either. We are learning more each day about the 
complex motivations of the human beings responsible for these exchanges. 
Much of this learning is happening outside of the legal academy. It 
is happening in economics departments and in business schools (as well 
as in psychology and neuropsychology departments, though I do not 
discuss that work here). In business schools, economists are learning a 
good deal about what contractors actually do. By incorporating relational 
expectations21 into economic modeling, transaction cost economics 
(“TCE”) scholars have discovered the presence of mutually-held 
expectations of cooperation, or relational behaviors in modern commercial 
business-to-business transactions. This work, which I explain a bit more 
in Part II, is one source of pressure on neoclassical contract law and its 
baseline assumption of individualism in contract. Moreover, behavioral 
and experimental economists use the tools of game theory to run lab 
experiments to predict what steps an individual economic actor might take 
under varied conditions. This work, which I explain more in Part III, shows 
that economic actors often make the choices unpredicted by the rational 
                                                     
 18. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 
(1981); Randy E. Barnett, Contract is Not Promise: Contract is Consent, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 647 
(2012). 
 19. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Economics and Sociology: The Prospects for an 
Interdisciplinary Discourse on Law, 1997 WISC. L. REV. 389 (1997). 
 20. See Roy Kreitner, On the New Pluralism in Contract Theory, 45 SUFFOLK L. REV. 915, 917 
(2012) (discussing ROBERT HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE 
OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAW (1997) (offering a typology, or “mapping,” of the 
various different kinds of theories considered to fall under the umbrella of pluralism)); see also Nathan 
Oman, Unity and Pluralism in Contract Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1499 (2005). 
 21. See, e.g., Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 340, 
341–43 (1983). 
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action paradigm. This work puts pressure on contract law’s exclusive 
underlying assumption of self-interest. 
B. The Possibilities 
Despite the growing body of empirical and experimental evidence 
showing the predictive failure of the rational action model, influential 
contract law scholarship maintains that contract law is better off 
unchanged. Dismissing the new evidence, these scholars argue that the 
best one can hope for is that contract law be both minimal and consistent,22 
and besides, they say, contractors often do not pay any attention to the law 
anyway.23 So, the theory goes, just keep it simple and contractors will 
adapt. Despite good reasons for these arguments, I believe this is a missed 
opportunity. There is an opportunity here for contract theory to help 
reshape contract law to better reflect what is actually happening in 
contracts. Indeed, the Uniform Commercial Code was a step toward 
modernization of commercial law. Now is a good time for contract law 
scholars to start reconceptualizing contract law based on what we now 
know contractors actually do. 
Specifically, the new empirical work by TCE scholars, and 
experimental work by behaviorists and game theorists, suggests two 
modern contract phenomena that are not well accounted for currently. 
These are what I call mutualism and dualism. Mutualism means the 
capacity of a contracting unit to jointly pursue goals beyond wealth 
maximization, such as flexibility or fairness. Dualism, by contrast, means 
the capacity of a single contracting actor to act from multiple 
motivations—such as selfishness and other-regardingness—at the same 
time. The remainder of this section will explain each of these phenomena 
in more detail. 
First, the contracting relationship itself can undertake dual-faceted 
commitments to further the success of the relationship. By that I mean the 
actors in the relationship can share joint expectations of non-contractually 
required, pro-social behaviors to promote the relationship itself. This is 
                                                     
 22. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 
19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597, 615 (1990) (“[Exchange parties] behave under two sets of rules: a strict set of 
rules for legal enforcement and a more flexible set of rules for social enforcement. It may be that the 
great lesson for the courts is that any effort to judicialize these social rules will destroy the very 
informality that makes them so effective in the first instance.”); cf. John E. Murray Jr., Contract 
Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 869, 891–907 (2002) (describing and 
rebutting neo-formalist critiques of the Uniform Commercial Code’s attempt to incorporate the norms 
of a contracting relationship into the definition of legal contract). 
 23. See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 
28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963); see also Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking 
the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1820 (1996). 
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mutualism: one relationship furthering the success of both parties.24 
Second, relational contract norms show that any single contracting actor 
is capable of acting from a place of dual intentionality. In other words, any 
single contractor can be motivated by both self-regarding and other-
regarding concerns at one time.25 This is dualism: one actor proceeding 
from simultaneously-held dual motivations.26 Thus, the complexity of 
human nature can manifest in a single actor involved in a contracting 
relationship (dualism), and across the relationship itself (mutualism). 
Reciprocity and solidarity, two contracting norms put to the test by 
TCE scholars, behaviorists, and game theorists, most directly manifest 
these complexities. Early proponents of relational contract theory 
understood this. Ian Macneil, the father of modern relational contract 
theory,27 argued that reciprocity and solidarity deserve special attention.28 
Macneil observed: “As students of man in society, we are faced with an 
illogicality. Man is both an entirely selfish creature and an entirely social 
creature, in that man puts the interest of his fellows ahead of his own 
interests at the same time that he puts his own interests first.”29 
In a frequently-quoted and memorable passage, Macneil 
explained: 
                                                     
 24. Relational Economics, supra note 5. Although I did not use this term then, the mutualism of 
a contracting unit is the subject of this piece. 
 25. By using the term “other-regarding,” I consciously mean to avoid the term “selfless.” I used 
the term selfless in prior work but it is not quite right. While awkward, other-regarding does a better 
of job of capturing what I mean. The meaning I intend to capture is that contractors can, and do, act 
simultaneously from opposing states. One of those is selfishness; the other is not so much selfless or 
even “social” (Macneil’s term). Rather, the opposite of selfish is other-regarding. The words selfless, 
unselfish, and even “altruistic” are not right because ultimately, the goal is to always make the 
relationship the most productive it can be. Further, the word social is not quite right because, in my 
view, social detracts from the economic nature of the transaction. I find that other-regarding works 
best because these words capture an intentionality to be interested in the “other,” without implying 
that the interest is either altruistic/selfless or otherwise purely non-economic/social. 
 26. See Jan B. Heide & Kenneth H. Wathne, Friends, Businesspeople, and Relationship Roles: 
A Conceptual Framework and a Research Agenda, 70 J. MKTNG. 90, 90 (2006) (“Our framework 
explicitly accounts for the possibility that different orientations (calculative and heuristic) and the 
associated roles (businessperson and friend) can coexist and that switching among them is both 
possible and likely.”); id. at 93 (challenging the assumption that the two “prototypical roles” (friend 
or businessperson) “either follow rules [i.e., friend] or maximize utility [i.e., businessperson], or more 
generally, that they play a single role (friend or businessperson) over time”). 
 27. Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REV. 2005, 
2009 n.9 (joking that while Macneil told his own students that he (Macneil) had invented relational 
contract theory, Macneil’s colleague, Stewart Macaulay, told his own students that Macaulay had 
invented it, and Scott told his students that Scott and his collaborator Charles Goetz together invented 
relational contract theory). 
 28. Macneil, supra note 21, at 347. 
 29. Id. at 348. 
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Such a creature is schizophrenic, and will, to the extent that it does 
anything except vibrate in utter frustration, constantly alternating 
between inconsistent behaviors—selfish one second and self-
sacrificing the next. Man is, in the most fundamental sense of the 
word, irrational . . . . Two principles of behavior are essential to 
the survival of such a creature: solidarity and reciprocity. Man, 
being a choosing creature, is entirely capable of paralysis of 
decision when two conflicting desires are in equipoise. The two 
principles of solidarity and reciprocity, neither of which can 
operate through time without the other, solve this problem. 
Getting something back for something given neatly releases, or 
least reduces, the tension in the creature desiring to be both selfish 
and social at the same time, and solidarity—a belief in being able 
to depend on another—permits the projection of reciprocity 
through time.30 
The research being done outside the legal academy suggests Macneil 
was right. To that research I now turn. 
II. MUTUALISM IS ALIVE AND WELL IN NEW INSTITUTIONAL 
ECONOMICS LITERATURE, BUT NOT IN LAW-AND-ECONOMICS 
LITERATURE. HOW DID THAT HAPPEN? 
In prior work, I wrote about TCE work that shows under certain 
conditions, commercial contractors intentionally hold and jointly rely 
upon expectations of relational behaviors, such as flexibility and voluntary 
information sharing.31 As I wrote in that piece, this work is largely 
unknown to legal scholars. This Part first names this phenomenon 
“mutualism,” after the mutual expectations these behaviors represent. 
Second, this Part provides a needed explanation of how and why it is that 
transaction cost economists have brought relational contract norms into 
their economic modeling, but legal economists have not. 
The economics that we in law are most familiar with—i.e., the 
dominant law-and-economics tradition—is traditional neoclassical 
economics. Neoclassical economic analysis studies exchange on the 
market. Under that approach, a firm is only interesting for its production 
                                                     
 30. Id. at 348–49. Others have commented upon this passage as well. See, e.g., Melvin A. 
Einsenberg, Why There Is No Law of Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 805, 813 (2000) (quoting 
Macneil, supra note 21, at 348); Sarah Maxwell, The Social Norms of Discrete Consumer Exchange: 
Classification and Quantification, 58 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 999, 1002 (1999); Catherine Mitchell, 
Contracts and Contract Law: Challenging the Distinction Between the “Real” and the “Paper” Deal, 
29 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 675, 687 (2009) (noting that in writing this passage, “Macneil regards 
this dualism as a reflection of human nature”). 
 31. Relational Economics, supra note 5, at 110. 
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function: a firm produces things to be traded on markets and its sole 
function is to maximize profits by market trade.32 In that view, a firm’s 
transactions are unimportant and irrelevant because they are assumed to 
be costless. Thus, it has been said that in orthodox economic analysis, the 
firm—and its motivations—are a “black box” into which one need not 
“peer.”33 
But, lurking deep in that black box is an important question: why 
have a firm at all?34 This is an inherently institutional question, and as 
such, it is not one that traditional neoclassical economics asks. That 
question was taken up by the new institutional economics (NIE). In a 1937 
paper, The Nature of the Firm, economist Ronald Coase hypothesized that 
firms exist to organize trade more efficiently.35 According to Coase, the 
boundary of the firm is an important economic variable—one that can be 
manipulated to minimize the overall costs of operating a firm and to 
enhance its profitability.36 In this vision of economics, unlike in the 
traditional vision, the costs of transactions cannot be assumed to be zero; 
instead, they are the name of the game.37 Until the transaction costs on the 
                                                     
 32. Oliver E. Williamson, The Evolving Science of Organization, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL 
THEORETICAL ECON. 36, 38–39 (1993) (describing the evolution of economics toward the study of the 
firm as an institution and away from the traditional conception of the firm as production function, and 
noting that it took some time for the shift to take root: “[b]e that as it may, the New Institutional 
Economics has crossed a viability threshold.”). 
 33. Gary Slater & David A. Spencer, The Uncertain Foundations of Transaction Cost 
Economics, 34 J. ECON. ISSUES 61, 62 (2000) (observing that “[f]or many years, the dominant 
neoclassical approach suggested that nothing would be gained from peering into the ‘black box’ called 
the firm; it was enough to know that it operated to maximize profits) (“The firm has been shunned in 
mainstream economics by an overriding emphasis on the efficient coordinating mechanism of the 
market.”). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 62–63 (discussing and citing Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMETRICA 
386 (1937)). 
 36. Id. at 63. 
 37. Although Coase—a Nobel Prize winner—is best remembered for his later work, The 
Problem of Social Cost, in which he said that in absence of transaction costs, the rules of market 
exchange and initial property distribution would be irrelevant because the parties would always 
bargain to the most efficient outcome, he never actually endorsed the core assumption upon which this 
premise is based: the absence of transaction costs. See David Campbell, The End of Posnerian Law 
and Economics, 73 MODERN L. REV. 305 (2010) [hereinafter Posnerian Law]. See also David 
Campbell, The Incompleteness of Our Understanding of the Law and Economics of Relational 
Contract, 2004 WISC. L. REV. 645, 649 (2004) (quoting Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 
in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 95, 114 (1988)) (“‘Markets are institutions that exist to 
facilitate exchange, that is, they exist in order to reduce the cost of carrying out exchange transactions. 
In an economic theory that assumes that transaction costs are nonexistent, markets have no function 
to perform, and it seems perfectly reasonable to develop the theory of exchange by an elaborate 
analysis of individuals exchanging nuts for apples on the edge of the forest or some other similar 
fanciful example. This analysis certainly shows why there is a gain from trade, but it fails to deal with 
the factors that determine how much trade there is or what goods are traded.’”). Instead, Coase never 
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market are high enough to justify the cost of hierarchical organization as 
a firm, a firm will not arise. Instead, economic actors will continue to 
contract with each other on the market. Only when the transaction costs of 
contracting become too high will they decide to combine, forming a firm. 
Thus, determining different institutional boundaries to maximize 
profitability requires accounting for the impact of transaction costs on 
exchange.38 
This shift in emphasis led eventually to a different and more realistic 
treatment of transaction costs in what is now known as NIE. With the 
development of NIE, the groundwork for including the variable of 
relational contract behaviors in economic modeling was thus in place. 
TCE did not always embrace relational contract norms as variables 
in its modeling. This changed as TCE increasingly challenged both the 
discrete model of classical microeconomics and its parsimonious 
assumptions. Indeed, Oliver Williamson cautioned his fellow institutional 
economists, quoting Ian Macneil: “[T]he discrete transaction—‘sharp in 
by clear agreement; sharp out by clear performance’ is very rare in both 
law and economics, and we deceive ourselves by treating it otherwise.”39 
Williamson argued that economics needed to be “more self-conscious . . . 
[of] ‘human nature as we know it.’”40 Thus, Williamson introduced two 
behavioral assumptions into TCE, each of which is particularly relevant to 
this project. 
First, Williamson distinguished between the purely rational actor, 
“economic man,” who exists only in theory, and “organizational man,” 
who operates in the real world and who is “boundedly rational” (though 
not irrational).41 Second, he distinguished the morality of organizational 
man from an idealized economic actor. Noting that organizational man is 
“motivationally . . . complex,” Williamson explained he is unlike the 
hyper-rational economic man, who always plays by the rules.42 Thus, the 
TCE approach requires the analyst to consider the costs arising out of the 
need to observe and control for opportunism, including the costs of 
                                                     
abandoned the core principle of his earlier work—work that eventually formed the basis of the new 
institutional economics. 
 38. EIRIK FURUBOTN & RUDOLPH RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC THEORY: THE 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 47 (2d ed. 2005). 
 39. Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach, 87 
AM. J. SOC. 548, 550–52 (1981) (internal citations omitted). 
 40. Id. at 553. 
 41. Id. at 553–54. 
 42. Id. at 554 n.9 (quoting Peter Diamond, Political and Economic Evaluation of Social Effects 
and Externalities, in FRONTIERS OF QUANTITATIVE ECONOMICS 31, 31 (M.D. Intriligator ed., 1971)) 
(“‘[S]tandard economic models . . . [treat] individuals as playing a game with fixed rules which they 
obey. They do not buy more than they can pay for, they do not embezzle funds, and they do not rob 
banks.’”). 
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negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing contracts.43 Eventually, 
recognizing that sociological variables could affect these costs, TCE 
scholars began to model relational norms.44 Orthodox neoclassical 
economics made none of these changes, and modern law-and-economics 
still excludes these variables from its modeling. 
In sum, TCE “explicitly incorporate[s] a number of Macneil’s 
notions and also acknowledge[s] the possible existence of bilateral 
relations.”45 Thus, unlike L&E scholars, NIE scholars treat relational 
contract norms as both true and useful.46 Relational principles have 
become integrated into how inter-firm transactions are studied. As these 
studies all examine the existence of relational norms of contracting 
behavior as bilateral expectations, the studies that confirm the presence of 
these norms are quite clear evidence of what I have called the mutualism 
of the modern economic transaction. 
As noted earlier, the second of human nature’s complexities that 
pervades real world contracts is the concept of dualism. Dualism means 
that individual economic actors themselves can, and often do, make single 
contracting decisions for multiple reasons, not just one (i.e., not simply to 
maximize utility). In the next Part, I argue that, as the TCE work shows 
mutualism in action, the behavioral and experimental economics work 
shows dualism in action. 
 
                                                     
 43. Ranjay Gulati, Does Familiarity Breed Trust? The Implications for Repeated Ties for 
Contractual Choice in Alliances, 38 THE ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 85, 86 (1995) (internal citation omitted). 
 44. See, e.g., Charles W. L. Hill, Cooperation, Opportunism, and the Invisible Hand: 
Implications for Transaction Cost Theory, 15 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 500, 511 (1990) (“If the wider 
context within which economic transactions are embedded is considered, it can be concluded that over 
time the invisible hand of the market favors actors whose behavioral repertoires are biased toward 
cooperation, rather than opportunism . . . . The error of conventional transaction cost theory comes not 
so much in the construction of the theory but from the failure of researchers to consider the implication 
of the wider context for the distribution of behavioral repertoires among a population of economic 
actors.”) (emphasis added); Akbar Zaheer & N. Venkatraman, Relational Governance as an 
Interorganizational Strategy: An Empirical Test of the Role of Trust in Economic Exchange, 16 
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 373, 379 (1995) (“The rationale for the key role of trust is straightforward: in 
the extreme case, it does away with formal contracts, which are costly to write, monitor and enforce. 
Thus, trust acts to reduce transaction costs by reducing or eliminating both ex ante and ex post 
opportunism.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 45. Jan B. Heide, Interorganizational Governance in Marketing Channels, 58 J. MARKETING 71, 
74 (1994). 
 46. A notable exception is Robert E. Scott, who finds relational contract norms useful for 
purposes of contract design, though not contract law. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson et al., Braiding: The 
Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1377 (2010). 
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III. DUALISM IS ALIVE AND WELL IN BEHAVIORAL AND 
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS STUDIES 
The notion of an individual economic actor who makes decisions 
from multiple motivations is dualism. While dualism might be a more 
familiar concept in law than mutualism,47 many legal scholars remain 
unconvinced that dualism can be successfully operationalized.48 That said, 
like with mutualism, there is now substantial scholarship outside of law 
successfully operationalizing dualism.49 Indeed, as the literature discussed 
here shows, economists engaged in conceptual and experimental work, 
from strategic management to behavioral economics and game theory, 
have concluded that although it is complicated, the dual-action model of 
human behavior has a place in econometric modeling.50 It seems that one 
key to those scholars’ success has been to extend, but not replace, the 
rational action model by relaxing some of its less realistic assumptions 
about human behavior.51 This work has received some attention from 
                                                     
 47. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of 
Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697, 711 (1990) (noting the possibility of a moral dimension 
of utility—that is, “that people are motivated by pleasure and by morality”) (emphasis in original); id. 
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objectives”). 
 48. Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1603, 1638 (2000) [hereinafter Limits of Behavioral Theories] (noting that while sociology and 
psychology have successfully improved our understanding of the human experience, that 
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effect of law on that experience). See also Richard Zeckhauser, Comments: Behavioral Versus 
Rational Economics: What You See Is What You Conquer, 59 J. BUS. S435, S438 (1986) (noting a 
lack of optimism that the conflict between rational choice and behavioralist economic theorists will 
be resolved any time soon, and noting that one reason why is that “[e]legant abstract formulations will 
be developed by both sides, frequently addressing the same points, but because there are sufficient 
degrees of freedom when creating a model, they will come to quite different conclusions”). 
 49. See Teck-Hua Ho & Xuanming Su, Peer-Induced Fairness in Games, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 
2022, 2022 (2009) (citing recent literature and comprehensively reviewing literature from the 
following sources: Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281 (1998); 
COLIN F. CAMERER ET AL., ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (2004); Teck-Hua Ho et al., 
Designing Pricing Contracts for Boundedly Rational Customers: Does the Framing of the Fixed Fee 
Matter?, 54 MGMT. SCI. 686 (2006); and Teck-Hua Ho et al., How “Psychological” Should Economic 
and Marketing Models Be?, 43 J. MARKETING RES. 307 (2006)). 
 50. For a similar conclusion in contract law, see Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing 
Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1672 (2003) [hereinafter Self-Enforcing Indefinite 
Agreements] (concluding that “the experimental evidence strongly suggests that the effect of 
reciprocal fairness, an effect that has thus far been neglected in contract theory, is an important element 
in optimal contract design”). 
 51. See, e.g., Matthew Rabin, An Approach to Incorporating Psychology into Economics, 103 
AM. ECON. REV. 617, 617 (2013) (arguing generally that psychological realism can improve our 
understanding of economic phenomena if operationalized properly, as “when done with the 
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contract law scholars generally, 52 but has received only minimal attention 
with regard to relational contract theory specifically.53 
This Part highlights some of what we can learn from economists who 
have studied dualism, who propose that fairness can serve as a motivating 
factor in economic behavior and that concerns for fairness take different 
forms, from inequity aversion to reciprocity. This work also shows that the 
different social roles played simultaneously by a contractor (a business 
person, a friend) can impact a contractor’s behavior. These conclusions 
are explored below. 
A. Fairness as Inequity Aversion 
While economists agree that “[b]y now we have substantial evidence 
suggesting that fairness motives affect the behavior of many people[,]” 
they do not agree on what that evidence means for the future of economic 
modeling.54 Part of the reason for a lack of consensus is that, for a long 
time, economic analysis produced conflicting results as to both the 
presence and potency of non-efficiency motivations underlying economic 
action.55 In an attempt to order this somewhat chaotic body of literature, 
Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt hypothesized that the divergent results 
might be explained simply—by adding to the standard model an additional 
cohort of actors who cared about fairness in addition to material payoffs.56 
This move, while small, turned out to be important for the long-term 
viability of modeling dualism. It allowed the authors to retain the 
assumption that people generally optimize and seek to make choices 
rationally. To this they simply added one additional assumption: some 
                                                     
mathematical and statistical rigor required by mainstream economic questions and methods”); 
Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Limited Rationality into Economics, 51 J. ECON. LIT. 528 (2013) 
(expressing support for modeling bounded rationality within the traditional, neoclassical framework 
because 1) doing so properly adjusts the utility model to include preferences other than wealth-
maximization, but at the same time is consistent with rationality, and 2) optimization models can help 
reveal limits to rationality). 
 52. See, e.g., Limits of Behavioral Theories, supra note 48, at 1638. Richard Posner has also 
been rather critical of behavioralism’s implications for law-and-economics. See Richard A. Posner, 
Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1557–58 (1998). 
 53. See, e.g., Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, supra note 50, at 1661–75 (2003) (discussing 
experimental economic research confirming “reciprocal fairness” as a motivation in economic 
behavior, and arguing that this literature holds valuable lessons with respect to designing incentive 
structures in contracts). 
 54. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation, 114 
QRTLY J. ECON. 817, 817–18 (1999) (concluding that there is a “bewildering variety of evidence” of 
conflicting conclusions regarding fairness and self-interest motivations). 
 55. Id. at 818 (noting conflicting evidence in fairness and cooperation studies, observing that 
“[s]ome pieces of evidence suggest that many people are driven by fairness considerations, other 
pieces indicate that virtually all people behave as if completely selfish, and still other types of evidence 
suggest that cooperation motives are crucial”). 
 56. Id. 
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actors also (not instead) care about fairness.57 Extending the model to 
include the variable of “fair types” largely maintained the core of 
econometric analysis but allowed the analyst to determine if, in certain 
conditions, a fair type might make a different choice than a purely rational 
actor.58 The results showed that in certain economic environments, fair 
types did make choices other than selfishness, and in certain environments, 
fair types influenced selfish types. These results meant that, at least under 
certain economic conditions, the predictive power of the purely rational 
actor model—assuming no fair types—was weaker than in models that did 
assume some fair types.59 
Notably, in this study the authors modeled fairness as “self-centered 
inequity aversion,” which they defined as the state in which people “do 
not care per se about inequity that exists among other people but are only 
interested in the fairness of their own material payoff relative to the payoff 
of others.”60 This kept the idea of fairness close to the rational action 
tradition in that fair types were less motivated by fairness concerns 
generally than they were with fairness concerns via-a-vis their own payoff 
relative to others. Similarly, in a later paper, authors Fehr, Klein, and 
Schmidt characterized inequity aversion as “a simple extension of the 
standard self-interest model that takes into account the fact that some 
people are not only interested in their own material payoff, but also dislike 
inequity.”61 Thus, fairness as inequity aversion allowed the analyst to 
account for non-efficiency motivations within the broader framework of 
utility maximization.62 
In the later paper, the authors hypothesized that fairness concerns, 
unexplained by self-interest, could impact the kind of contract parties 
choose to enter.63 The authors conducted a series of experiments where 
principals could choose either a bonus contract or an incentive contract to 
offer to an agent.64 The standard self-interest model predicted that subjects 
in the experiment would favor the incentive contract over the bonus 
contract.65 However, the results showed the opposite: once the model 
                                                     
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 819 (“We show, in particular, that the economic environment determines the preference 
type that is decisive for the prevailing behavior in equilibrium.”). 
 59. Id. at 819, 855–56. 
 60. Id. at 819. 
 61. Ernest Fehr et al., Fairness and Contract Design, 75 ECONOMETRICA 121, 123 (2007) 
[hereinafter Fairness and Contract Design]. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 121. 
 64. Id. at 121–22. 
 65. Id. (explaining that the authors based their prediction that subjects would choose the incentive 
contract over the bonus contract on the assumption that all subjects are rational actors; this, however, 
proved to be untrue, as many of the subjects opted for fairness over rational action). 
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included the presence of some fair subjects, the contracts predicted to be 
found optimal under standard contract theory turned out to be far less 
efficient, and contracts predicted to be inefficient turned out to be 
superior.66 
Importantly, these effects were not predicted by the standard self-
interest model.67 The model showed that concerns for fairness explained 
the deviation from the standard prediction, and the authors concluded that 
fairness could affect the incentive effects of contracts.68 The study implies 
that different contract enforcement mechanisms will work differently 
given the characteristics of different agents: “[i]ncentive contracts that are 
optimal when there are only selfish actors perform less well when some 
agents are concerned about fairness”; however, “implicit bonus contracts 
that cannot work when all actors are selfish provide powerful incentives 
and become superior when there are fair-minded players.”69 
These two studies alone could have profound effects for contract law. 
Importantly, these studies show that it is possible to know when—under 
what economic conditions—individual economic actors will likely choose 
fair rather than efficiency-maximizing actions. Understanding that 
variable could answer one of the chief L&E criticisms of the 
behavioral/relational contract project, which is that the economic models 
have yet to be replicated showing the predictive effect of law on the human 
experience.70 If it is possible to model the effect of economic conditions 
on the human experience, it ought to be possible to model the combined 
effect of legal and economic conditions on the human experience. As will 
be explored later in Part V, such a combined model might shed light on 
what seems to be the intractable problem of how to think about meaningful 
consent to legal-ware when consumers lack bargaining power over legal-
ware provisions. 
B. Fairness as Reciprocity 
A second set of experimental studies explored a slightly different 
concept of fairness: fairness-as-reciprocity. The fairness-as-reciprocity 
model was originally developed in 1993 by Matthew Rabin.71 Rabin 
challenged the idea that the only real exception to self-interested economic 
                                                     
 66. Id. at 121. 
 67. Id. at 122. 
 68. Id. at 151. 
 69. Id. at 150–51. 
 70. See, e.g., Limits of Behavioral Theories, supra note 48. 
 71. See, e.g., Fehr, supra note 54, at 852 (situating Rabin’s 1993 paper as developing a theory of 
reciprocity: one which “rests on the idea that people are willing to reward fair intentions and to punish 
unfair intentions”). 
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behavior was altruism, meaning pure generosity.72 Rabin observed that 
psychology research showed that altruistic behavior was more complex 
than that.73 For example, it showed that people could be altruistic—with 
conditions. 
Specifically, Rabin noted that existing psychology research showed 
that rather than consistently seeking to help others, people tended to mete 
out helpfulness according to how helpful or generous others were to 
them.74 For example, Rabin cited studies showing that in ultimatum 
games, people routinely forwent the self-interested action—i.e., they self-
sacrificed, instead of wealth-maximized—if they perceived that doing so 
would rightly punish an unfair actor.75 This research suggested that rather 
than responding to a pure generosity principle, these self-sacrificers 
seemed to be responding to a reciprocity principle: if someone is kind to 
me, I’ll reciprocate; if someone is mean to me, I’ll reciprocate that too.76 
Assuming that such tit-for-tat behavior had economic consequences, in his 
paper Incorporating Fairness Into Game Theory and Economics, Rabin 
developed a game-theoretic framework for incorporating what he called 
similar emotions into “a broad range of economic models.”77 
Rabin applied his model to two economic problems implicating 
fairness: monopoly pricing and labor economics. In both situations, 
behavioral economists had previously studied fairness, though not by 
using the tools of game theory.78 Only the monopoly pricing problem will 
be discussed here. That problem was why consumers who, in the face of 
monopoly pricing, refused to buy a product even if they considered the 
product worth the price being charged.79 Standard economic theory 
predicted that a rational actor should buy the product because having a 
product worth the price—even if the product is being sold by a 
monopolist—is better than not having it. But behavioral experiments 
showed that consumers would refuse to buy in that situation.80 The theory 
was that these consumers were willing to self-sacrifice to punish an unfair 
                                                     
 72. Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1281, 1281 (1993). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1283–84 (reviewing research, including Richard H. Thaler, Anomolies: The Ultimatum 
Game, 2 J. ECON. PERS. 195 (1988); Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit 
Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728 (1986); and Daniel Kahneman et al., 
Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. BUS. S285 (1986)). 
 76. Id. at 1281. 
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actor.81 Rabin hypothesized that his model would offer proof of this 
hypothesis, and it did; Rabin found that reciprocal fairness explained the 
consumers’ behavior.82 
In a second foundational reciprocity study, Steven Hackett 
investigated the conventional wisdom regarding the conditions necessary 
to sustain relational exchange. Hackett defined relational exchange as an 
exchange where the parties’ observable ex ante investments were 
implicitly linked to ex post surplus sharing rules—where the “implicit 
link” took the form of some sort of proportionality principle.83 Hackett 
hypothesized that the proportionality rule of relational contract might hold 
even in the absence of two hallmarks of relational exchange: the presence 
of reputational concerns and the opportunity for repeat play.84 Building on 
earlier work,85 Hackett tested this hypothesis in the context of a problem 
particular to relational contract: nested bargaining.86 
Competing theories predicted different sharing rules. Hackett noted 
that traditional game theory predicted that surplus sharing rules would 
develop as they would in any bargaining situation, according to bargaining 
power.87 By contrast, equity theory predicted that as long as the parties 
were aware of each other’s initial investments, the parties would develop 
proportional surplus sharing rules, even in absence of the other two 
conditions.88 Hackett hypothesized that the standard game theory 
prediction was wrong.89 
Hackett found that when the parties’ original investments were 
observable to each other, the proportionality rule held even when there 
was no opportunity in the game for players to form individual reputations 
and no opportunity for repeat play between players.90 This was an 
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 83. Steven C. Hackett, Is Relational Exchange Possible in the Absence of Reputations and 
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 85. Id. at 361 (quoting Victor Goldberg, Relational Exchange: Economics and Complex 
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 87. Id. at 362. 
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two structures argued to support relational exchange”). 
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important finding because prior to this study, the proportionality principle 
observed in relational exchange was routinely explained not as a 
manifestation of fairness concerns but rather by the structure of relational 
contract itself: when players are concerned about reputations and repeat 
play, as they typically are in relational contracts, they will find it in their 
self-interest to act fairly toward each other. According to this standard 
explanation, any observed fairness would be explained by self-interest,91 
yet Hackett’s study demonstrated that even when these two strategic 
conditions were removed, the players still respected the proportionality 
principle. Thus, Hackett concluded that while reputation and repeated 
contact are undoubtedly important to relational exchange, “relational 
exchange may also be supported by social norms of equity.”92 The results 
“support[] Macneil’s claim that social norms of equity are central to 
relational exchange.”93 
Hackett’s conclusion negates the idea that all economic action, even 
fair economic action, is exclusively strategic; instead, it supports the 
dualism thesis. This finding warrants further attention from contract 
theorists in law. At the broadest level, this data offers further support for 
Macneil’s conception of the economic actor as dualistic. Moreover, the 
data supports Rabin’s argument that relaxing this assumption under the 
right conditions can improve our understanding of the dualistic economic 
phenomenon.94 Finally, on a more granular level, data showing fairness as 
a reciprocity norm could add to ongoing conversations about the 
challenges and complexities of incomplete contracts, and even, as will be 
discussed in Part V, the viability of certain rules of the common law in the 
face of particular economic conditions. 
C. The Impact of Social Roles on Economic Behavior 
While the studies examined so far considered different ways that 
fairness motivates economic behavior, a third set examined a different 
influence: social roles.95 To examine the effect of social roles, authors 
Heide and Wathne generated a new conceptual framework. Their 
framework considered how a single actor could, in one relationship, follow 
multiple behavioral roles and respond to two different internal logics: on 
one hand, the role of a business person (which follows the logic of 
consequences and rules) and on the other, the role of a friend (which 
                                                     
 91. One sees this explanation often in economic accounts of relational contract. See, e.g., Posner, 
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 92. Hackett, supra note 83, at 362. 
 93. Id. at 360. 
 94. See Rabin, supra note 72, at 1282. 
 95. Heide, supra note 26, at 90. 
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follows the logic of appropriateness and norms).96 Prior to this work, 
analysts typically assumed that an economic actor followed one role or the 
other.97 The authors hypothesized that the either/or nature of each side’s 
assumptions were too narrow and limiting. 
The authors observed that each of these two differing perspectives 
derives from a unitary value: either self-interest or social construction, but 
not both.98 The authors—echoing Macneil—hypothesized that a model 
that could account for an actor’s capacity to respond sometimes to 
economic self-interest and sometimes to social heuristics should hold 
more predictive power than one that could not.99 To create this capacity, 
Heide and Wathne’s framework thus depicted the processes by which 
relationship roles are created, maintained, diluted, or changed, and 
concurrently predicted whether a relationship would succeed given a 
particular combination of role, expected behavior, and actual behavior.100 
They suggested that the newly developed framework should allow future 
researchers (and perhaps even managers) to take even more nuanced 
approaches to matching governance structures with relationship roles.101 
The ability to model behavioral nuance could be critical to convincing 
traditional L&E scholars to be more receptive to this work. 
Finally, in another and relatively recent study considering the 
influence of social norms on behavior choices, Fershtman, Gneezy, and 
List hypothesized that different manifestations of fairness might be 
explained by an actor’s selection of a particular social identity from 
competing identities.102 Specifically, the authors hypothesized that when 
an acceptable social norm justifies a selfish action, a person who would 
not act selfishly in the absence of that justification may indeed choose to 
act selfishly.103 This theory not only raises important questions about the 
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interrelationship between law and social norms, but it also supports the 
idea that single actors can select among alternative models of behavior 
given differing environmental conditions.104 
One interesting problem that studies like this might inform is the 
legal problem of opportunism. Opportunism is notoriously difficult to 
define legally. Williamson defines it as “self-interest seeking with 
guile.”105 Posner defines it as when, in a bilateral monopoly situation 
featuring sequential performances, the latter-actor takes advantage of the 
former’s performance by simply not performing.106 Timothy Muris 
describes it by illustration.107 Although these studies do not solve the 
definitional problem, they illuminate a reason why defining opportunism 
is so hard: what seems opportunistic in one situation might not actually be, 
depending on the background social norms of that situation.108 As the 
authors of this recent study emphasized, “future research should focus on 
how the properties of the situation influence behavior.”109 Perhaps that 
future research could help contract law to better distinguish anti-social 
opportunism from pro-social competition in any particular case or in any 
recurrent transactional structure. 
In sum, while the standard assumption in orthodox economics and 
law-and-economics has been that rational actors will care only about 
economic interest, not social interest, the frameworks and results 
developed in the studies canvassed here suggest they are driven by 
multiple motives and varied economic conditions and that self-interest will 
not always dominate the social motivation. The challenge is to relax or 
even build on this assumption in a way that does not destroy the predictive 
power of the traditional framework and adhere to rigorous methodology 
in the process. As this research shows, this can be done. 
It is now time to revisit the question of whether these insights can or 
should have any impact on contract law and theory. I answer those 
questions with an unequivocal “yes.” As I will discuss in the next section, 
the behavior that modern contractors expect of themselves and each other 
                                                     
 104. A similar though different study is Ho, supra note 49, at 2022. There, the authors noted that 
in addition to being driven by general equity or distributive justice fairness concerns, “in many real-
life situations, people are also driven by social comparison.” Id. at 2023 (internal citations omitted). 
They hypothesized that “peer-induced fairness concerns can be more salient than distributional 
fairness concerns when agents engage in social comparison.” Id. 
 105. Williamson, supra note 39, at 554. 
 106. If the latter simply absconds with the benefit of the first party’s earlier performance, then 
the latter has acted opportunistically. Richard Posner, The New Institutional Economics Meets Law 
and Economics, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL THEORETICAL ECON. 73, 81 (1993). 
 107. Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 
521, 522–24 (1980–1981). 
 108. Fershtman, supra note 102, at 143. 
 109. Id. 
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lines up remarkably well with what contract law should expect if contract 
law were interpreted more consistently with its philosophical foundation. 
That foundation, as legal historian James Gordley argued, is derived from 
Aristotelian philosophy.110 
IV. THE ARISTOTELIAN UNDERPINNINGS OF MUTUALISM AND 
DUALISM 
As this Part will explain, the way modern economic actors contract—
demonstrating both mutualism and dualism—is consistent with the 
Aristotelian concept of justice in private exchange. The research set out in 
the prior Parts show that there are contractors for whom Aristotle’s 
conception of a just private exchange would likely ring true. Real world 
contractors tell researchers, and experimental behavioral economic studies 
also suggest, that while efficiency is of course a core goal of an economic 
transaction, how the contracting partners treat each other can also be 
surprisingly important to both commercial contractors and individual 
economic actors. Indeed, the work shows that how the partners engage 
with each other—in Aristotelian terms, the contract’s means—can direct 
transactional behaviors, choices, and expectations in surprising ways. That 
this is so shows common ground between the ancient Aristotelian concept 
of just private exchange and what modern contractors do and expect each 
other to do. 
Notably, I am not claiming that goals other than economic gain, such 
as fairness or reciprocity, displace the goal of economic benefit. Indeed, 
such an either/or way of thinking about contract is a trap set by the monist 
paradigm itself. Instead, this Article’s thesis is that because Aristotelian 
thinking and reasoning processes both means and ends symbiotically—
such that the choice of how one pursues one’s goal (means) is as important 
to the analysis as the choice of what goal should be pursued in the first 
place (ends)—and because modern contractors report that how they pursue 
economic gain matters in ways that can drive contracting choices—
analyzing modern contracting from an Aristotelian perspective seems 
quite promising.111 
A. Mutualism’s Virtue: Commutative Justice 
At first, it may seem that no two theories could have less in common 
than a twentieth century law-and-sociology anti-theory of contract and the 
ancient Greek theory of virtue ethics attributable to Aristotle. And yet it 
turns out that they have a lot in common. Both Aristotle and Macneil were 
                                                     
 110. See, e.g., PRIVATE LAW, supra note 4. 
 111. See Virtue and Contract Law, supra note 6, at 703. 
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realists and were concerned with actual behaviors. As described in Part I, 
the point of relational contract theory was to illustrate what contractors do 
more realistically than traditional neoclassical contract theory. Similarly, 
while it is still not well appreciated in law, Aristotle’s Ethics was 
fundamentally practical: he was concerned with how well equipped 
citizens were to make choices that would best preserve self-rule in a true 
democracy.112 Aristotelian virtue ethics is an ethics for imperfect 
people.113 No person is perfect, nor can we be, otherwise we would be 
gods, said Aristotle in Politics.114 Aristotle did not assume away man’s 
imperfections; instead, in Ethics, we learn how to live our best lives in our 
state of imperfection. Aristotle’s advice is the same when it comes to 
exercising the virtue of justice. 
Broadly speaking, in Aristotelian terms, “[j]ustice is a kind of 
equality; therefore injustice is a kind of inequality . . . .”115 Aristotle 
conceived of two different types of justice.116 The first concerns 
distribution of common goods, or what we call distributive justice. 117 
Aristotelian distributive justice is based on merit, or “desert.”118 The 
second concerns a kind of proportional equality in voluntary interpersonal 
engagements.119 This is the concept of commutative (or corrective) 
justice.120 David Bostock offers this account of Aristotelian commutative 
justice: 
                                                     
 112. See, e.g., MICHAEL D. CHAN, ARISTOTLE AND HAMILTON ON COMMERCE AND 
STATESMANSHIP 12 (2006) (recognizing that the perfect government does not exist and Aristotle’s 
advice in the Politics is realistic, not perfectionist). 
 113. See, e.g., JAMES GORDLEY, The PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT 
DOCTRINE 19 (1993) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS] (explaining that “[w]hen [Aristotle] 
discussed virtues such as promise-keeping, commutative justice, and liberality, he was applying this 
method to the study of human beings”). 
 114. See, e.g., MICHAEL DAVIS, THE POLITICS OF PHILOSOPHY: A COMMENTARY ON 
ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS 7–8 (1996). 
 115. THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO ARISTOTLE 222 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1995) [hereinafter 
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION]. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 222–23 (explaining further that “[o]n the assumption that we were on an equal footing 
before, the fair exchange preserves the equality between us”). 
 118. IZAHK ENGLARD, CORRECTIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: FROM ARISTOTLE TO MODERN 
TIMES 6 (2009). 
 119. CAMBRIDGE COMPANION, supra note 115, at 222. 
 120. The two concepts of justice are interrelated, though sometimes discussed as discrete: 
[T]hat concern for justice in private transactions—largely a matter of commutative 
justice—cannot be divorced from concern for distributive justice. The relation was 
explained by Thomas Aquinas. Distributive justice governs ‘the order of the whole toward 
the parts, which concerns the order of that which belongs to the community in relation to 
each single person.’ Commutative justice governs ‘the order of one part to another, to 
which corresponds the order of one private individual to another.’ 
PRIVATE LAW, supra note 4, at 12. 
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In each case one party (the victim) has suffered a loss, and the 
other (the offender) has made a corresponding gain. So the fair 
way of rectifying the situation is to restore the status quo; the 
offender should be made to give up his ill-gotten gain, which 
should then be restored to the victim, so that the result is ‘equality’ 
once more.121 
Disproportionality results when “[o]ne person has too much and 
another too little. He has too much . . . in voluntary transactions because 
things of unequal value have been exchanged. Justice is done by taking the 
amount necessary to restore equality from one party and giving it to the 
other.”122 Gordley suggests that a just contract should not introduce any 
new inequalities into the position each party was in before the exchange: 
The point of contracts of exchange is to allow the parties to 
exchange resources so that neither party enriches himself at the 
other’s expense. . . . fairness, in the sense of commutative justice, 
is not a sort of limitation on these bodies of law but belongs to 
their definition.123 
The point is that from an Aristotelian perspective, to be a just 
contractor, a party must be at least somewhat other-regarding. A contractor 
who lacks any concept of other-regardingness would presumably not 
hesitate to seek all advantage that she could possibly get, irrespective of 
her action’s impact on the other side. That sounds like the purely rational 
economic actor,124 but it does not sound like the contractors who have been 
studied in the TCE and behavioral and experimental work. Those 
contractors respond to nuances in ways that are not accounted for in the 
purely-rational action models. 
                                                     
 121. DAVID BOSTOCK, ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS 61 (2000). Commutative justice is sometimes also 
called corrective justice because the idea is to correct the disproportionality caused by an unjust 
interaction. ENGLARD, supra note 118, at 7–8 (“Corrective justice’s aim is to restore the original 
positions of both the person who suffered the loss and the person who gained the profit at the other’s 
expense. Aristotle describes the ‘correctively just’ as the arithmetic mean between the part of the 
earner and the part of the loser.”). 
 122. PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS, supra note 113, at 13. Moreover, as to modern contract law, 
Gordley has written that “one cannot define the rules of contract . . . without regard to commutative 
justice, or in other words, without regard to the effect of these rules on the distribution of resources 
between parties.” PRIVATE LAW, supra note 4, at 12. 
 123. Id.; see also PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS, supra note 113, at 55 (“Commutative justice does 
not simply mean that parties exchange, but that they exchange so that neither party is enriched at the 
expense of the other.”). 
 124. A truly rational economic actor would seek all the advantage she could, but she would not 
take advantage of the other side. Instead, as noted in Part III, she would “play by the rules,” because a 
truly parsimonious model of economic behavior does not and could not account for the costs imposed 
by deviance from this neutral baseline. But of course, the rational actor would, subject to this 
theoretical limit, seek all the gain she could. 
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B. Commutative Justice in Modern Contracting 
As described in Part II, we know from the TCE work incorporating 
Macneil’s relational contract norms in typical contracts in various 
industries that contractors do in fact find value—even economic value—
in other-regarding behaviors. The trick is that they must have mutually-
held expectations. It was the discovery of jointly held, mutual expectations 
of other-regarding behaviors that eventually persuaded TCE scholars to 
change the way they think about, and model, modern contractors. To 
appreciate this, one must understand what came before it. 
Prior to robust testing for relational norms in this literature, the 
prevailing wisdom among transaction cost economists who studied 
industrial buyer–seller transactions was that when one prospective 
contracting party came to the bargaining table in a more powerful position 
than the other, the stronger party would always benefit most (and should) 
from seeking to maintain or improve upon that position. But, after scholars 
began to test for relational norms, they learned that this is not in fact what 
such parties did. Specifically, in a foundational TCE study—one of the 
first to test for and confirm the bilateral expectation of relational norms—
the authors observed that the more powerful party in industrial buyer–
seller relationships would often cede that control to the other partner. To 
explain this unexpected observation, the authors hypothesized that the 
parties’ joint expectations of relational behaviors made that structure of 
the deal possible in the first place.125 
In a passage that sounds downright Aristotelian (i.e., doing the right 
thing at the right time for the right reason), the authors concluded: 
Contrary to the notion that control is desirable per se, firms should 
structure relationships in a discriminating way, based on the 
characteristics of the situation in question. Firms should not 
pursue control as a goal in its own right, but only attempt to 
acquire control when specific assets are at risk. From the other 
side, it is not always wrong to cede control. The key is to be 
protected against abuse of control, and relational norms can serve 
that purpose. Hence supportive norms have significant economic 
value when specific assets need to be safeguarded.126 
Importantly, I am not claiming that these contractors were 
consciously “being” Aristotelian. I am, however, claiming that when 
studies like this demonstrate the presence of bilateral relational contract 
norms in real world contracts, those real world economic behaviors are 
consistent with behaviors that an Aristotelian account of commutative 
                                                     
 125. Relational Economics, supra note 5, at 108–11 (discussing Heide, supra note 45, at 32). 
 126. Heide, supra note 45, at 41–42. 
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justice would expect. In sum, mutualism—the shared expectations of 
cooperative behavior that contractors consciously hold—and dualism—
the capacity of any individual contracting actor to be motivated by non-
efficiency concerns (i.e., fairness, inequity aversion, reciprocity), even in 
situations where one might expect purely selfish motivations—are 
remarkably consistent with the Aristotelian philosophy of just private 
exchange. 
To Aristotle, a just private exchange is one where each contractor 
benefits, but neither at the expense of the other. What the research 
described in Parts II and III demonstrates is that in certain conditions, both 
in commercial and individual economic transactions, we should expect 
contractors to intend an exchange where each benefits (a mutual 
expectation of the contract’s goal), but neither at the expense of the other 
(a mutual expectation of the contract’s means). And these are the findings 
of a discipline wedded to mathematical methodology.127 
Now the critical question becomes: so what? What can or should 
contract law or contract law theory do about it? My final argument is that 
legal analysis of contracts would be more coherent if both contract law and 
theory better accounted for the possibility of relational goals in contract. 
What that might look like is the subject of the final part of this Article. 
V. ACCOUNTING FOR MUTUALISM AND DUALISM IN MODERN 
CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 
A system of contract law that could account for a contract’s 
complexities—specifically, the complexities of mutualism and dualism 
inherent in relational contract behaviors—is one that would better capture 
the internal practices and values of the participants than do traditional 
contract law theories. Such a system would be remarkably consistent with 
the Aristotelian ideal of just exchange. In this Part, I describe a 
fundamental reconceptualization that would need to happen to make that 
system possible: thinking about contract law as not in service of a single 
normative value, but instead as facilitating commutative justice. Finally, I 
offer an example of what that reconceptualized analysis might look like in 
the context of a paradigmatic modern contract problem: enforceability of 
the mandatory arbitration term-in-a-box. 
 
                                                     
 127. Though the question is beyond the scope of this Article, it bears noting: what might they 
find if economists were to expand their research methods beyond the mathematical model? There have 
been multiple calls for economists to expand their methodology, and since the Recession of 2008, 
those calls have increased. See, e.g., Relational Economics, supra note 5, at 121–22; Posnerian Law, 
supra note 37; CRESPO, supra note 10, at 81–99. 
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A. A Modern Aristotelian Conceptual Method 
Single value theories attempt to explain or organize law, and 
ultimately influence courts, around single normative values. The idea is 
that a particular value already is or should be inherent in the common law 
of contract (i.e., efficiency, promise-keeping, consent), and for that reason 
courts ought to apply the common law to the particular legal issue in front 
of them consistently with that value. The point of this subsection is that, 
as to contracts, this method of theorizing law puts the cart before the horse. 
Sometimes the most simple, elegant truths are hidden in plain sight. 
Such is the case with contract. Contracts are rules—private law—that 
parties set for themselves. Unlike statutory law, like criminal law, 
designed to incentivize an entire community to do X or not do Y, a contract 
is designed to facilitate a particular relationship—a relationship entered 
into in order to accomplish some particular exchange goal in some 
particular way. From that perspective, it seems odd to say that the common 
law of contract ought to be interpreted as being about a single value—a 
value that the parties ought to learn so that they can make their contract 
conform to it.128 Instead, it seems that the common law of contract ought 
to facilitate the relationship achieving its goals consistent with what we 
know about the practice of the institution of contract itself. 
What we know about contract is that it is both a selfish and an other-
regarding endeavor, chosen by parties to bring about some result that will 
benefit both parties. We know that individual parties can be both selfish 
and magnanimous. We know that parties will set goals and expectations 
for themselves and the other, sometimes living up to them and sometimes 
not. These things we know because they are inherent both in human nature 
and in the nature of contract. Finally, by quantifying these behaviors, the 
studies in Parts II and III show that they can be modeled economically.  
Is it remotely realistic to think that contract law—the common law 
and the Uniform Commercial Code as they exist today, not some new law 
or law of relational contract129—could be applied, in the hands of 
individual judges in particular disputes, in a way that fundamentally 
prioritizes what we know about the institution of contract? In a way that 
takes the dualistic nature of the practice of contract as a given and asks, 
with regard to the particular dispute, how does the dispute fit within what 
                                                     
 128. See, e.g., Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Penalty Default Canon, 72 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 663 (2004). 
 129. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There Is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 
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we know about contract? If that were possible, it would resemble the 
Aristotelian analytic method. 
James Gordley has written that if Aristotle could analyze a twenty-
first century contract, he would probably approach the analysis as he 
approached any other: by first determining the end or purpose of the thing 
at issue (i.e., the contract), and then asking what means would best 
effectuate those ends: 
He wanted to analyze almost everything the way one would a 
couch, discovering its purpose or what it does, and the 
contribution that each of its parts makes to this purpose. In the 
13th century, Aquinas began his commentary on Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics by noting that there are two basic types of 
order: the order of part to whole, and the order of means to ends. 
The second, he said, is based on the first. The parts of the couch 
such as the back, arms or legs each have a purpose which itself is 
a means to the ultimate end of the couch. That is why they count 
as parts. Each part has the structure it does so that, working in 
harmony with the other parts, it can serve this ultimate end. One 
can discover the purpose of each part and of the couch as a whole 
by examining how it is built. The purposes are implicit in the 
structure.130 
From our twenty-first century point of view, this may seem a bit odd. 
Approaching the analysis of a contract like the conceptual analysis of a 
couch sounds strange. And yet, if we zoom out a little bit, we might stop 
and question whether we have lost sight of the forest for the trees. 
Philosophers and historians of both law and economics have begun 
reminding us in recent years that our current analytic methods are 
relatively recent intellectual inventions. For example, they remind us (with 
increasing urgency after the crash of 2008) that economics was not, for 
most of its intellectual history, a value-neutral practice.131 They also 
remind us that the current preoccupation with parsimonious modeling is a 
by-product of a particular approach to social science generally; it is not 
intrinsically required by economics.132 They also remind us that like all 
                                                     
 130. James Gordley, When Paths Diverge: A Response to Albert Alschuler on Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, 49 FLA. L. REV. 441, 450 (1997) (internal citations omitted). 
 131. See, e.g., CRESPO, supra note 10, at 59 (“Economics has gradually drifted away from its 
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means led to a practice of modeling that valued abstraction over realism, to the point where Milton 
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good things, one can have too much: at some point, parsimony stops 
facilitating something bigger (i.e., knowledge) and starts becoming the 
focus of the modeling project itself. At that point, Crespo observes, the 
parsimony assumption itself must be revisited.133 
This “difficult balance between realism and simplification” has been 
with economics for a long time and is not likely going away soon: 
It is easy enough to make models on stated assumptions. The 
difficulty is to find the assumptions that are relevant to reality. The 
art is to set up a scheme that simplifies the problem as to make it 
manageable without eliminating the essential character of the 
actual situation on which it is intended to throw light.134 
Gordley reminds us that the same is true of law, and particularly, of 
contract law. Gordley’s meticulous work tracing the history of private law 
generally, and contract specifically, reveals that Aristotelian philosophy 
was, until relatively recently, inherent in Western law. Its influence waned 
over time as Aristotelianism became less and less understood. 
Gordley writes that Aristotelian philosophy was interwoven with 
Western law in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when 
scholars attempted—for the first time—to organize and explain legal 
decisions. Prior to that point, cases existed, but no one had attempted to 
organize or explain them. This first systematicization of law was 
undertaken by a group Gordley calls the late scholastics, and it was they 
who synthesized “Roman law with Greek philosophy, and in particular, 
the philosophy of Aristotle.”135 Gordley argues, in sum, that the first 
“systematic doctrinal structure” of the law of obligation, which we now 
know as contract law, resulted from this synthesis.136 The chief 
Aristotelian philosophical principle around which the legal principles of 
                                                     
Friedman’s contemporary successors believe that the more abstract and unrealistic the model, the more 
predictive it will likely be). See also Posnerian Law, supra note 37, at 326–27 (2010) (reviewing 
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 134. Id. at 68 (quoting JOAN ROBINSON, ECONOMIC HERESIES 41 (1971)). 
 135. PRIVATE LAW, supra note 4, at 4. 
 136. Id. 
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voluntarily-assumed obligations were first synthesized is commutative 
justice.137 
So what happened to the Aristotelian philosophical principles—to 
commutative justice? Gordley writes that, in the end, the doctrinal 
organizational structures produced at that time survived, but the 
philosophical principles and their inherent analytic method did not. Those 
principles (for example, each benefits, but neither at the expense of the 
other) were victims of the Enlightenment, “rejected, not because they 
contradicted common sense, but rather because common sense was no 
longer accepted as a proper standard.”138 In its place, post-Descartes 
philosophical method morphed from the conceptual, dialogical method to 
the deductive reasoning method we have today.139 Moreover, the 
Enlightenment philosophers saw Aristotelianism as inconsistent with the 
ideals of rationality and free will.140 Hence, will theories began to be used 
in explaining and justifying existing legal doctrine—doctrine that had 
been built on the older standards and methods. This mismatch produced 
modern doctrine that superficially prioritizes deductive reasoning and free 
will, and yet is internally incoherent, tossing about for meaningful 
philosophical explanation.141 
No single value theory of contract has put the pieces back together 
again. For some, the idea of pluralism holds some promise, but right now, 
legal scholars do not even agree as to what pluralism means.142 Against 
this backdrop, perhaps it does not seem so bizarre after all to think about 
a contract the way one might think about a couch. The next section will 
illustrate just such a problem in contract law—a doctrine casting about 
with no coherent theoretical explanation or direction—and then consider 
how that same doctrine might be made coherent by reconnecting it to its 
Aristotelian roots. 
                                                     
 137. Id. at 14–15. 
 138. Id. at 5. 
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B. The Method Applied to a Paradigmatic Contract Problem: 
Mandatory Arbitration Term-in-a-Box 
This story is a recurring problem for contract law. A customer orders, 
for example, a Bluetooth speaker from Amazon, and the product is 
shipped. Inside the shipping container is not only the speaker, but a set of 
legal terms and conditions, or “legal-ware” as Judge Easterbrook dubbed 
them in the new contracts classic, Hill v. Gateway 2000.143 One of the 
terms is a mandatory arbitration provision. Another is a term that tells 
buyers if they do not agree to all terms and conditions, they should return 
the product within a set amount of time for a full refund. The customer 
likes the speaker and has no intention of returning it. She happily enjoys 
her speaker and just as happily ignores the legal-ware. And why should 
she bother with the legal-ware? The deal is done; she has her speaker, and 
there is nothing she could do about the terms in the box anyway. 
Inevitably, something goes wrong with the speaker, which the 
consumer determines, after a bit of googling, is systemic. The speaker has 
been designed to require an expensive replacement component far too 
early in the lifetime of the speaker, and then require further replacements 
more frequently than it should. The customer and others similarly situated 
suspect fraud. They contact a class action lawyer and file a suit. Rather 
than defend in court on the merits, the speaker manufacturer asks the court 
to dismiss the case based on the mandatory arbitration provision every 
purchaser received in her shipping container. Should the court enforce this 
provision? 
The law is indeterminate, to say the least. The threshold problem is 
which law to apply: the common law or the Uniform Commercial Code 
(“U.C.C.”)? The sale is for a speaker, which is a movable good, so you 
might say the U.C.C. should apply.144 If so, then the problem is likely 
governed by the U.C.C.’s provision on imperfect acceptance, Section 2-
207.145 But the problematic term binds the customer to arbitration as an 
alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”), which is not covered by the 
U.C.C. Even as to what body of law to apply, the law is indeterminate. For 
illustration purposes, because the Seventh Circuit analyzed it under the 
common law, let’s assume the common law should apply. 
Next, what provision of the common law should apply? Is it the rule 
of blanket assent, the basic objective manifestation of acceptance rule? If 
so, then because the customer kept the product beyond thirty days, the 
customer accepted both the speaker and the terms in the box.146 Or is it the 
                                                     
 143. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997).  
 144. Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1339–41 (D. Kan. 2000). 
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rule of acceptance by silence or inaction, because the customer did not do 
anything affirmative at all with respect to the terms in the box? She simply 
left it there. If she had no real notice that there would be additional terms 
in the box, then she is not on constructive notice to look, and the rule for 
acceptance by silence or inaction would apply.147 Or should we back up 
another step: should the law consider the offer to purchase the speaker a 
different offer, with a different acceptance, than the offer to participate in 
ADR (generously characterizing the unilateral imposition of the 
mandatory arbitration term in this example as an offer)? 
The Seventh Circuit encountered this issue in 1997, and chose to 
analyze it under the common law, after summarily rejecting the argument 
that the U.C.C. ought to apply.148 Under the common law, the court applied 
the rule of blanket assent and thus easily determined that terms-in-the-box 
were enforceable. The court reasoned that the customer’s failing to return 
the computer after being given the opportunity was sufficient as a 
manifestation of assent to the terms in the box.149 As noted, this is not the 
only possible analysis, and other courts have refused to follow the 
reasoning, finding it flawed for various reasons. 
So the law is indeterminate. Theorizing, however, is not advancing 
the ball much. The Seventh Circuit in Hill v. Gateway was taken with 
economic theory. On the basis of commercial efficiency, the Seventh 
Circuit reasoned that in mass manufacturer-to-consumer transactions, the 
rule should be that the “vendor is the master of the offer”: 
Practical considerations support allowing vendors to enclose the 
full legal terms with their products. Cashiers cannot be expected 
to read legal documents to customers before ringing up sales. If 
the staff at the other end of the phone for direct-sales operations 
like Gateway’s had to read the four-page statement of terms before 
taking the buyer’s credit card number, the droning voice would 
anesthetize rather than enlighten many potential buyers. Others 
would hang up in a rage over the waste of their time. And oral 
recitation would not avoid customers’ assertions (whether true or 
feigned) that the clerk did not read term X to them, or that they 
did not remember or understand it. Writing provides benefits for 
                                                     
 147. Norcia v. Samsung Telecomms. Am., LLC, 845 F.3d 1279, 1287–90 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 148. Citing only its own prior decision as authority, the court rejected Hill’s argument that the 
later-coming form in the sale of a movable good triggered the U.C.C.’s rule on imperfect acceptance, 
stating “[t]his argument pays scant attention to the opinion in ProCD, which concluded that, when 
there is only one form, ‘sec. 2–207 is irrelevant.’” Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150 (quoting ProCD, Inc., v. 
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
 149. Id. at 1148. Moreover, somewhat between the lines, it seemed important to the court that 
the customer knew there was warranty information that she did not yet have when she originally agreed 
to buy the computer, so the customer was on constructive notice that terms, including the warranty, 
were coming in the box. See id. at 1149–50. 
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both sides of commercial transactions. Customers as a group are 
better off when vendors skip costly and ineffectual steps such as 
telephonic recitation, and use instead a simple approve-or-return 
device.150 
Yet, twenty years later, the Ninth Circuit was not as impressed with 
economic theory. When Samsung asked the Ninth Circuit to accept this 
same argument, the court declined: 
In the absence of support from California courts, Samsung urges 
us to conclude, as the Seventh Circuit did in Hill, that the 
practicalities of consumer transactions require the enforcement of 
in-the-box contracts and that consumers expect that products will 
come with additional terms. We decline this request. Even if we 
were persuaded by Samsung’s argument, “the Legislature, and not 
the courts, is vested with the responsibility to declare the public 
policy of the state.” If the California Legislature believes that its 
current commercial code fails to strike an appropriate balance 
between consumer expectations and the burden on commerce, it 
can amend the law.151 
The point is that when courts cannot agree on what rule should apply, 
and when they disagree as to which theory should influence the law, the 
law is under-performing our expectations. We want law to be determinate 
and predictable. We want to at least know that a particular set of facts will 
trigger the application of a particular doctrine. When this does not happen, 
and when each court’s different doctrinal choice is justifiable by different 
precedent or different theory, we can safely conclude that something is not 
working. 
What to do? I have suggested an Aristotelian conceptual analysis. 
Such an analysis would start with the thing to be analyzed, and work from 
there. Let’s return to one of Gordley’s go-to examples, the couch. Can a 
contract be analyzed like a couch? 
Like a couch, a contract has multiple parts to it. Each of the contract’s 
parts relates to—serves—the whole. A couch cushion alone does not 
function as a couch; the cushion is useful in service of the couch. It is easy 
to see how. However, is a mandatory arbitration term similarly in service 
of the purchased product (a speaker, a computer)? This is less clear. The 
term serves the product’s seller, but does it serve the product being sold? 
It matters because if the ADR term is as integral to the product sold as the 
cushion is to the couch, then the blanket assent rule applied in Hill might 
make sense: those terms probably should stand or fall together. But of 
                                                     
 150. Id. at 1149 (internal citation omitted). 
 151. Norcia, 845 F.3d at 1290. 
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course, the ADR term does not serve the speaker or the computer as the 
cushion serves the couch. 
To see why not, consider that a purchaser shopping for a couch can, 
and likely will, shop for cushions of different comfort levels. The price she 
is willing to pay will reflect her comfort with the cushions on the couch. 
But a purchaser shopping for a computer, or in our example, a speaker, 
cannot shop for ADR terms that are more or less suitable for her needs. 
She cannot agree to a price that corresponds to her comfort with that term. 
Indeed, as Judge Easterbrook recognized in Hill, we modern consumers 
are busy people, and we simply do not read or appreciate every boilerplate 
term (whether set out online or in a shipping container) that comes with 
purchasing a product. Moreover, as to ADR specifically, a consumer is 
likely only to discover such a term if, at some later point, the product turns 
out to be defective in some sense, and if this defect is serious enough to 
justify her seeking a remedy in court. Only then will an ADR term become 
salient to the consumer. The seller knows this. 
Seen from this perspective, an ADR term is more like the adhesive 
used to fasten couch material to the underside of the frame than it is like 
the cushion used to make the couch comfortable. An ADR term is not a 
core aspect of the thing purchased; neither is the adhesive, but the cushion 
is, and both are (arguably) necessary. The consumer will discover the 
properties of the cushion which are important to her prior to formation, but 
the same is not true with respect to either an ADR term or the adhesive. 
Another angle on this problem is one suggested by the inequity 
aversion studies in Part III, and that is whether the consumer has any 
economic power over the term at issue.152 As noted, she does have a say 
                                                     
 152. Given the possibilities of research outlined in Part III, it would be fascinating to study 
whether, if consumers subject to mandatory ADR terms could in fact punish sellers for unfair ADR 
terms, the consumers’ desire for fairness (inequity aversion) could influence sellers to voluntarily offer 
better ADR terms. As Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt determined, fair types have more or less success 
influencing selfish types to be more equitable across differing economic environments. Fairness and 
Contract Design, supra note 61, at 855–56. For example, fair types are likely to have more influence 
over selfish types in bilateral negotiations than in competitive markets. Id. Importantly, according to 
the authors, standard rational action models are more predictive in environments where fair types are 
less able to exert any influence over their counterparts; where fair types have more power, the standard 
rational action models begin to fail. Id. at 856. Yet the standard rational action models are the models 
that lawyer–economists like Judge Easterbrook are presumably thinking of when they write 
economically-minded opinions like the opinion in Hill. 
 Take the example in Hill—the binding arbitration term in the box. According to the inequity 
aversion modeling surveyed in Part III of this Article, even if we assumed a competitive market for 
the underlying product (a computer, a speaker), if a single purchaser has no opportunity to impact the 
“material relative payoff” of the ADR term, then the selfish actor will continue to advantage herself 
and behave selfishly. See id. However, if the consumer has the ability to influence that payoff (as in a 
bilateral negotiation, or even a competitive market for ADR terms), these models suggest the fair types 
could more successfully influence the selfish types to design contracts with more equitable ADR 
provisions. Yet the blanket assent rule of the common law of contract—at least as interpreted and 
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in the comfort of her couch cushions because she can shop for comfort 
before purchasing. As noted, and unlike a couch cushion, neither an ADR 
term nor a particular adhesive is likely to warrant any attention from the 
consumer when shopping. As such, these terms are perfect sites for a seller 
or manufacturer to cut corners. Buyers have no power as to these terms 
and sellers know it. As cases like Hill (and the inequity aversion studies, 
and our collective common experiences as consumers!) readily show some 
companies do try to benefit at the consumers’ expense in situations like 
this. The question is: Should contract law support those efforts? 
Per Aristotelian commutative justice, the goal of contract law would 
be to enforce terms that serve the normative goal of each benefits, but 
neither at the expense of the other. What is at issue here is one of the means 
of the Aristotelian equation, so we should focus our analysis there. Does 
the mandatory arbitration term-in-the-box pass the test for the means of a 
just exchange, which neither party benefits at the expense of the other? 
(Does the adhesive?) Is the company thereby benefitting at the consumer’s 
expense? It might be; it might not be. Like everything in law, it depends 
on the facts. 
The facts we need to consider include the following: assuming that 
there is a functioning market for arbitration terms (which there probably 
is not, but could be if they were priced separately and could be shopped 
for, similar to long-term warranties), is the arbitration term competitive? 
Is the arbitration provider well-regarded by consumer interest groups? Do 
they have enough locations such that no consumer has to travel more than, 
say 100 miles, to get to an arbitration provider? Or can arbitration be done 
virtually at no cost to the consumer? Is the process fair to the consumer, 
really? These questions show that it is certainly possible to imagine an 
arbitration term that would be competitive and consumers could choose to 
accept, just as it is possible to an adhesive that work well and consumers 
could choose to accept. If the ADR term works well at a price one is 
willing to pay in a competitive market, then there is no reason to assume 
the term necessarily enriches one at the expense of the other. 
Against proposals like this one, lawyer–economists tend to make 
three arguments. First, they argue that ADR terms, and especially 
mandatory arbitration terms, are critical to mass manufacturer–consumer 
deals because of cost. Providing extra notice is expensive, as is litigation, 
                                                     
applied by economically-minded judges like Judge Easterbrook—removes that ability. The blanket 
assent rule, as the opinion in Hill so eloquently shows, precludes any single consumer from any ability 
to impact the “material relative payoff” of a binding arbitration term in a box, which in turn removes 
any incentive for an unfair seller to offer better terms. 
 Thus, the inequity aversion economic modeling suggests that the blanket assent rule 
malfunctions in these economic conditions—a problem economists have discovered, but 
economically-minded lawyers have not. Yet. 
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and the costs of consumer protection would simply be passed on to 
consumers, driving up prices. Judge Easterbrook suggested as much in 
Hill. 153 But this is a red herring. Even if some ADR provision is necessary 
to keep consumer products affordable, just as a couch needs some adhesive 
to hold the material to the frame, the particular term selected does not have 
to be non-negotiable, hidden, and favoring sellers; it does not have to be 
one that effectively enriches sellers at consumers’ expense. In short, while 
mass market sales contracts might need some ADR term to keep consumer 
products affordable, just as a couch needs some adhesive to hold the 
material to the frame, the law could require terms that do not enrich sellers 
at consumers’ expense. 
Lawyer–economists also argue that the solution is not more 
disclosure because more disclosure just does not work. They argue that 
consumers would still ignore boilerplate terms that they could not 
change.154 This argument is answerable by reference to the same core 
principle, which is that if the law held manufacturers and sellers to a 
standard requiring that companies not enrich themselves at the consumer’s 
expense, then manufacturers and sellers would write contracts to meet that 
standard. In other words, our hypothetical speaker company would figure 
it out, perhaps charging a bit more for a contract offering a dispute 
resolution term a bit more favorable to consumers. 
A third argument lawyer–economists make is a formalist one, based 
on certainty and predictability: how will any speaker manufacturer know 
when its mandatory arbitration term in the box is sufficiently other-
regarding so that a court will enforce it? How will the company know if a 
particular ADR provider is sufficiently well-regarded or has enough 
physical locations to pass the test? These are not easy questions, but we 
have the same uncertainties today. The truth is that no one really knows 
how marginal legal issues will come out until they are litigated enough 
times that patterns emerge, and even then we do not know for sure. No one 
knew for sure that the Ninth Circuit would reject both doctrinal and 
theoretical arguments that impressed the Seventh Circuit. No one knew for 
sure that the District of Kansas would say the U.C.C. applies to sales of 
computers, even though the Seventh Circuit dismissed that argument out 
of hand.155 
                                                     
 153. See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149 (“Consumers as a group are better off when vendors skip costly 
. . . steps such as telephonic recitation . . . .”). 
 154. See OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: 
THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014). 
 155. Again citing itself as authority, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the later-
coming form in the sale of a movable good triggered the U.C.C.’s rule on imperfect acceptance, stating 
“[t]his argument pays scant attention to the opinion in ProCD, which concluded that, when there is 
only one form, ‘sec. 2–207 is irrelevant.’ 86 F.3d at 1452.” Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150. 
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In sum, the Aristotelian approach to contract law analysis treats the 
role of contract law as facilitating a relationship between parties who have 
various goals. It does not treat contract law as ultimately in service of one 
social value or other.156 Indeed, the reconceptualization of common law 
that I am proposing here follows in the tradition of the legal realists’ 
overhaul of commercial law via the U.C.C. The U.C.C. was intended to 
modernize commercial law to better account for the practices of real world 
commercial actors. Hence, commercial reasonableness plays a large role 
in Article 2 provisions. My proposal that the common law of contract be 
interpreted and applied as to facilitate the normative goal of each benefits, 
but neither at the expense of the other, is not unlike making commercial 
reasonableness a touchstone of commercial law.157 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that the key to solving the terms-in-a-box 
problem, and likely similar problems of modern contract law, is to analyze 
them from the perspective of an Aristotelian just exchange, using 
conceptual reasoning. Though surprising, upon reflection, this approach is 
not unlike the proposal to reform commercial law to better serve the 
internal practices of commercial actors. The argument here is motivated 
by the same concerns that motivated the early legal realists: the law is not 
keeping up with modern contracting practices, and forcing contractors to 
tailor their practices to particular legal rules— just because those are the 
rules— gets the project backward. 
                                                     
 156. From the single value debate, other debates follow—for example, the debate over whether 
informal terms ought to be “formalized” or legalized. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 30. Another 
example is the debate on default rules and how they should be determined. See generally Alan 
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Common Law of Contract and the Default Rule Project, 102 VA. L. 
REV. 1523 (2016). 
 157. Of course, the entire “incorporation strategy” of Article 2, by which courts hearing 
commercial cases are instructed to incorporate the informal norms of the relationship into the 
enforceable rules of that relationship, has its detractors. They are the same scholars who, after much 
careful and thoughtful deliberation, have concluded that because all prior common law modernization 
projects have failed, the best solution is the neo-formalist minimalist approach. See, e.g., Robert E. 
Scott, Is Article 2 the Best We Can Do? 52 HASTINGS L. J. 677, 685 n.25 (2001) (“The norm of 
commercial reasonableness is variously expressed in Article 2, sometimes just with the injunction 
‘reasonable,’ but always directed to or qualified (usually explicitly) by a broader reference to 
commercial practice. See, e.g., §§ 2-103(1)(b), 2-204, 2-205, 2-206, 2-208, 2-305, 2-308, 2-309, 2-
211, 2-402, 2-503, 2-510, 2-513, 2-603, 2-604, 2-605, 2-607, 2-608, 2-609, 2-610, 2-614, 2-706, 2-
709, 2-710, 2-712, and 2-714.”); see also id. at 685 n.26 (“As I have suggested on previous occasions, 
the elimination of the merchant jury from Article 2 while retaining the pervasive notion of commercial 
reasonableness was, in consequence, a drafting disaster.”) (citation omitted). See also Bernstein, supra 
note 23, at 1765 (describing the Article 2 philosophy as “the idea that courts should seek to discover 
‘immanent business norms’ and use them to decide cases,” which is known as the Code’s 
“incorporation” strategy). 
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The truth is that when they can and when it makes sense, modern 
contractors already do behave, and expect the same from their contracting 
partners, in ways that would meet the requirements of an Aristotelian just 
exchange. As this Article has spelled out, those requirements are that, for 
an exchange to be just, the exchange must be one in which each benefits, 
but neither at the expense of the other. Emerging empirical and 
experimental research proves to us that contractors are complex, but that 
economics does have the tools to model those complexities. One aspect of 
that complexity is shared commitments to mutualism of the contracting 
unit. Another is the choice to intentionally sacrifice profit in favor of 
another value. Another is whether the contracting conditions give the fair-
minded types any real power to influence the selfish types. The real 
question now is whether contract law ought to account for these 
complexities. My answer to that question has been a resounding yes. 
In sum, this Article has argued that an Aristotelian contract 
jurisprudence could make good sense of what modern contractors tell 
academic researchers they, in fact, mutually expect of each other, and that 
with more advanced modeling, we too could predict. Because of this 
possibility, we ought not give up on law’s ability to make sense of contract 
as it is actually practiced. 
